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Anti-carrier Warfare and Naval Operational Art
by
James J. Tritten
The U.S. military has only recently taken offensive anti-
carrier warfare operations against enemy carrier battle groups
seriously. Why? Because we have not had to since 1945. There
have not been any adversaries who have had attack carrier battle
groups since the WW II air strikes against Formosa and the defeat
of the Japanese in the Battles of the Philippine Sea and Leyte
Gulf. Those conditions will change as the Soviet Union deploys
its next generation of air capable surface combatants and they
evolve into what we in the West know as true multi-purpose air-
craft carriers.
The U.S. Navy and NATO have already developed a sound
maritime strategy to deal with the Warsaw Pact navies. Strategic
thinking in NATO navies is at a high point and will probably
remain so over the next decades. Naval tactical thought is also
going through a renaissance although the optimal tactical employ-
ment of individual weapons systems has always been a strong point
for the Allies.
U.S. and NATO maritime strategy explains what types of forces
will be applied where in the world to achieve certain objectives.
Tactics for individual platforms show us how to utilize specific
weapons systems in the most efficient manner. There is a cate-
gory of warfare that bridges strategy and tactics that is known
as operational art. The term came from the German and has found
a home in the Soviet military. Perhaps the best parallel term in
naval parlance is standardized fleet tactics. Simply put;
strategy tells us where, when, and why to fight; operational art
is the framework for fighting a combined arms force; and tactics
is the method of employing individual units and weapons systems.
Operational art could be the framework for addressing how to
best employ our combined (all services) arms against the emerging
Soviet carrier battle group threat that somewhat resembles Allied
WW II multi-carrier task force operations. Operational art could
be the framework for answering questions such as: do we need to
attack and destroy enemy carrier battle groups in a particular
theater of military operations in order to achieve our broad
strategic objectives; or the classic question of where to best
intercept the sea lines of communication - at the terminals or
along the route; or how to best defend convoys - with direct
defense or the indirect approach.
Lacking a ready made "cook book" (nor should there be one) on
how to best attack the threat platforms of the future, and
currently lacking a framework for naval operational art, we
should consider creating such an architecture and using offensive
anti-carrier warfare (ACW) as the case study to flesh it out.
Simply put, we should evaluate past combat experience and the
wealth of knowledge that we already have concerning fleet air
defense and over the horizon targeting, so that we can then deal
with the substance of offensive ACW. This report will propose
such a plan so that we can best understand future force and
training needs.
Operational art as a concept is not well understood by
navies; indeed there are many who argue that such a concept is
neither real nor required; contemporary naval tactical planning
being all that is required. As our fighting capabilities shift
over time, due to the impact of less support for military forces
or due to the impact of ever increasing costs of weapons systems,
we are simply going to have to turn to better strategic,
operational, and tactical planning as a force multiplier. Opera-
tional art could be the glue that can hold together our strategy
and tactics.
The U.S. Army and the National Defense University have been
investigating the concept of operational art and appear to be
headed in the direction of taking it more seriously. The U.S.
Naval War College has begun to explore the issue and the first
course on naval operational art is now being taught at the U.S.
Naval Postgraduate School. VADM Henry Mustin's U.S. Second Fleet
"Fighting Instructions" are an example of attempting to deal with
the operational level of warfare although the term operational
art is not used. Germans have accepted the operational art con-
cept for years and should be in a position to assist us coming to
grips with it.
The most important reason for trying to define operational
art is that the Soviet armed forces have a naval operational art.
There already is a large body of available Soviet naval litera-
ture translated into English. We should do reverse engineering
to learn what it is that the Soviet have and get an appreciation
for the concept. It is Soviet naval operational art that will
govern how the Warsaw Pact will be employed in offensive ACW
against the U.S. and NATO navies. It is Soviet operational art
that we have essentially already prepared for in our existing
defensive ACW tactics.
If there was ever a project that need to be "Joint," and
under the leadership of naval officers, it is the study of
operational art and consideration of whether or not we need to
create a naval operational art. Our leading military
intellectual organizations, such as Strategic Studies Group at
the U.S. Naval War College, the strategic planning faculty at the
Naval Postgraduate School, the Strategic Concepts Development
Center at the U.S. National Defense University, Federal Executive
Fellows assigned to varying institutions and similar national
organizations working in close coordination with the the NATO
Defence College, the International Military Staff, and similar
international groups appear to be the best places to take the
lead and create the framework for helping the U.S. and NATO to
fight smarter in the next century.
If we decide that there is indeed some merit to the concept,
we should turn to our war-fighting naval commanders-in-chief to
actually prepare a practical naval operational art. CINCLANT,
CINCPAC, SACLANT, SACEUR, and CINCHAN could draw upon the exist-
ing body of knowledge for how to fight in their respective
geographic areas. They can draw upon the various national
tactical development groups that have addressed the operational
level of warfare in specific theaters of military operations.
The U.S. and NATO navies are already extremely good at their
understanding of, and in preparations for, fleet air defense. We
have studied the open-source literature that explains Soviet
concepts of offensive operations against aircraft carriers. We
have watched Soviet exercises and understand the capabilities of
their weapons systems. We have taken our own defensive ACW very
seriously for years since we recognize that Soviet offensive
capabilities stress us. What we need to do is to apply our
expertise about defensive ACW to offensive concepts and
operations in order to stress the Soviet Navy in the same manner.
Western military establishments have a ready-made source of
information on offensive anti-carrier warfare: the experiences of
our own forces that have for years acted at aggressors during
numerous fleet exercise. Our own military establishments have
formed adversary units whose function it is to conduct raids on
our own carrier battle groups (CVBGs) during training. Have any
of these forces ever thought through their experiences in
attacking Western CVBGs in terms of how they might attack Soviet
units? We should be able to draw on this exercise data, analyze
it, and determine the answers to such operational art questions
as: (1) to achieve massing against an enemy CVBG, should we
employ many low profile air platforms such as cruise missiles and
F-5s or do a few large but very capable units such as B-52s have
a better chance; or (2) are small diesel submarines as effective
as larger nuclear ones in penetrating CVBG possible even if
strategic warning is given?
Instead of Western naval leaders worrying about the use of
Soviet anti-ship cruise and even ballistic missiles against our
CVBGs, let us create planning problems in the Kremlin by having
them worry about a multiplicity of threats against their ships.
Let's make Fleet Admiral Chernavin's job selling his navy to the
Politburo as difficult as possible. Perhaps we can make it easy
for the Soviet Defense Ministry to say "no" to requests for a
bigger and more offensive fleet by showing them that the West has
already thought through and can counter any planned capability
that exceeds defense of the homeland and bastions.
Another source of already developed expertise that can serve
to enhance our creation of an offensive ACW operational art is
our concept of multi-platform over-the-horizon (OTH) targeting.
Here is an existing body of naval operational concepts that some-
what approximates what is termed operational art. When the
Soviets deploy multiple carrier battle groups, our existing OTH
will have to be enhanced anyway. We can build on our existing
body of knowledge and simultaneously learn what operational art
is.
Our existing OTH will have to be changed to account for a
more robust threat and to better utilize the more limited numbers
of assets that are likely to be in our armed forces in the
future. If as the former U.S. Secretary of the Navy says, a
modern U.S. aircraft carrier can bring the equivalent firepower
of forty WW II carriers, it is up to us to also recognize that
the strategies, operations, and tactics that one would employ if
he had forty carriers are not the same when we actually only have
one.
Taking a page from the Soviet book and understanding their
view of combined arms (all service) operations may also be in
order. Many of our current OTH and other fleet operations make
full accounting for the wide range of naval platforms that can be
used against enemy surface targets. We already exploit the many
advantages, in certain joint operations, by combining assets from
other services for the completion of specific missions. Perhaps
we can learn something by just considering how the Soviets plan
to go to war?
The Soviet concept of multi-service operations, under the
operational control of naval commanders while in the oceanic
theaters of operations, or under the control of TVD and front
commanders in continental theaters of operations should be
explored and compared to our own joint experiences. The Soviets
employ a more than simply what we refer to as electronics
warfare. The fleet can extend the air defense perimeter of the
homeland air defense forces. Soviet methods of achieving
survivability of their ballistic missile submarines by active
defense is well known. Perhaps the well integrated Soviet
concept of combined arms amphibious warfare that makes full use
of all services and the "civilian " merchant marine is the best
example of different concepts of operations that can be
considered operational art.
We know how and where to train global and naval strategists.
We already train and exercise naval officers in multi-carrier
operations and tactics. What may still be needed, however, is
the training and education of military officers in the
operational level of war in terms of multi-service, combined
nuclear and conventional warfare. Do we train officers to
command and employ the multiplicity of diverse forces that
existed in WW II? Is there a point to revisiting the combined
arms experiences of that war? Has enough time passed to
impartially discuss the command and control problems of the
Battle of Leyte Gulf or is it best to assume that there will
always be "fog" in war?
We should look at our historical experiences in successful
anti-carrier warfare against the Japanese while that generation
of heroes is still available for advice. Were our successful
campaigns a result of intuitive operational art concepts of
operations or were they simply due to good naval (single service)
tactics? Was there a conscious decision to defeat the Japanese
navy by the attrition of pilots rather than carrier hulls or was
this discovered only during after action analyses?
• We know that the Japanese learned at the Battle of Midway
that they had insufficiently prepared for defensive fleet
operations and defense of their carriers. Did not the Battle of
Midway refute the conventional wisdom of some in the 1930s who
said land-based air power (alone) would be able to defeat an
enemy fleet that would approach the shores of the U.S? None of
the B-17s, B-26s, or PBYs that participated in that battle sunk
any enemy ships. These are concepts of operational art and have
their parallels today.
Even if the U.S. does not consciously recognize and have
naval operational art, do other nations? We should at least ask.
If there was an operational art in World War II, including
offensive anti-carrier warfare, should we re-create and build
upon it, or have the qualitative changes in the types of naval
forces and the weapons available made the lessons of history
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irrelevant? Is there a parallel in a future debate between OTH
using missiles vs. aircraft and the debates of the 1930s over
battleships vs. carriers? What will the role be for naval
aviation if the primary strike platform against Soviet carrier
battle groups becomes sea-launched missiles, torpedoes, or
ballistic missiles?
If there is utility to studying the past war, should we not
also take advantage of our former enemies and learn if they had
an operational art for offensive anti-carrier warfare against us?
The Italians, Germans, and the Japanese all could provide inputs
on what types of operations were found to be best employed when
striking British and American aircraft carrier task groups. A
cooperative historical research project under a NATO fellow seems
most appropriate. The U.S. Center for Naval Analyses has already
done some of this when they looked at the experiences of
defending against Japanese kamakazi attacks as a surrogate for
gaining insights on defense against Soviet cruise missiles.
We should recall that history tells us that no U.S. fleet
carrier was sunk by a kamakazi and the USS SARATOGA hull survived
a 20 kiloton air burst at the Bikini tests. The U.S. Naval
Institute probably has a unique ability to make its oral history
and similar files available to researchers. What better way to
use the wealth of historical data that they have accumulated than
to attempt to find its relevancy today? Recent combat experience
should not be overlooked either: the Falklands war for example.
Naval intelligence services should be able to tell us who else,
besides the USSR, since the end of World War II, has attempted or
even planned anti-carrier warfare.
Wargaming is another methodology that can and should be
employed to address Soviet carrier battlegroup vulnerability. A
best, worst, and "reasonable" threat case for the future Soviet
Navy should be gamed against a wide range of potential force
mixes. Gaming will not provide the answers as to what types and
how many forces we need in the next century against these likely
threats, but they can lead to insights, surface ideas, and
provide data that should be subjected to rigorous analysis.
Gaming is the ideal environment to test varying theories of
operational art.
From analysis of the ACW issue, a number of useful products
can arise. First, we may better be able to prioritize our
acquisition of forces that can place the most leverage against
the likely threats to the nation. Second, we can ensure that we
educate our leaders and train our operational commanders to fight
smarter in a qualitatively new environment. Third, we can begin
to think through possible Soviet naval aviation developments/
deployments that we may want to attempt to influence and control
by the use of arms control as a supplement to good military
preparation.
Arms control has been used by the Soviets for years to enter
our defense decision-making process; let's reverse the process.
We should not think in terms of only military solutions to
military problems. If we can prevent or minimize the impact of
naval threats to the nation by a combination of military pre-
paredness and negotiated agreements, we should explore both.
However, we should not expect nor ever allow arms control to
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become an end in itself or a substitute for proper defenses.
If we perceive the Soviet CVBG threat as being significant
and a first order Alliance problem, then we should be prepared to
adopt a long-term strategic plan to help the Soviets to decide
not to build them. For example, can we stress the Soviet economy
sufficiently to make it unlikely that rubles will be available
for the construction of forces that would be more bothersome to
us? One example of such a possible action is the retention of a
manned bomber force by the NATO nations. By doing so, we may
force the Soviets into a very costly and man intensive defensive
posture making it more likely that funds will not be available
for new naval forces that would be capable of new missions. If
the strategy failed, we would end up with military forces that if
properly employed, could be useful against those enemy carrier
battle groups.
What emerges from these considerations is an opportunity to
be very forward looking and approach an emerging problem in a
top-down logical manner. We will not have this threat of
multiple Soviet carrier battle groups in the 1980s and probably
not in the 1990s. But it is likely that we will have to face
this issue in the next century, the time is now to decide on the
best force mix and the solutions are likely to also require long
lead times and it is not too early to consider them. The stra-
tegic planning decision needs to be made now to get into the
offensive ACW business by the year 2000.
U.S. and NATO maritime strategy is forward-based, offensive,
and should cause the Soviets to react during a crisis or war in a
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manner that enhances the deterrence and will terminate the con-
frontation on terms that are favorable to the Alliance. Our
tactics are the finest that our fleet commanders can devise.
What we may still need, however, is a naval concept of operations
at the operational level of warfare, that will maximize our joint
effectiveness against the Soviet multi-carrier battle groups of
the future. We at least should research the issue and define what




1. Defense Technical Documentation Center 2
Cameron Station
Alexandria, VA 22304-6145
2. Dudley Knox Library 2
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943-5100
3. Director, Net Assessment 5
OSD/NA Room 3A930
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Washington, D.C. 20301
4. CAPT Anthony Maness, USN 2




5. VADM Henry C. Mustin 1
DCNO Plans, Policy and Operations
OP-06/Room 4E592 PNT
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Washington, D.C. 20350
6. CAPT P. T. Deutermann, USN 2
Strategic Concepts Branch
OP-603/PNT Room 4E486
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Washington, D.C. 20350









Santa Monica, CA 90406-2138




Department of National Security Affairs (56)
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943-5100






3 2768 00341728 8
